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Yvette Monga
“Au village!”: Space, Culture,
and Politics in Cameroon*
Throughout Africa there has long existed a tension between the creation of
parochial ethnic identities and the simultaneous creation of a unified
national identity. Cameroon exemplifies this situation especially well.
Economic inequalities and social injustice in the country have provided fer-
tile ground for politicians to exploit cultural differences by engaging in a
political discourse that emphasizes ethnic particularities and the importance
of localities, with a recent focus on village affiliation and rural constituen-
cies. The ethnicization and ruralization of politics in Cameroon have led
political entrepreneurs not only to redefine the geo-cultural boundaries of
their ethnic labels and “villages”, but also to display their cultural differ-
ences as a way of marking their cultural space, distinguishing themselves
from potential or actual “enemy” groups, and “recruiting” allies. Thus,
depending on the circumstances, ethno-cultural space and to some extent
villages themselves have been depicted either as “territories” to be defended
against “invasion” by “strangers” from other parts of Cameroon, or “battle-
fields” in the political game of give and take with the regime. While politi-
cians are thus sacrificing the very notion of a common Cameroonian
nationality and identity, some artists and intellectuals have drawn on the
same categories to try to break ethnic boundaries and define a popular
national culture characterized by acceptance of ethnic differences.
This essay examines from a historical perspective the process by which
the pervasive experience of economic and social injustice in Cameroon has
come to be perceived and voiced primarily in ethnic and regional terms.
It questions the extent to which expressions of ethno-cultural differences
can be used effectively to pursue and achieve political goals. Finally, it
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop “Cameroon: Biog-
raphy of a Nation” organized by Amherst College under the title “Ethnic-hood
or Nationhood: the experience of economic inequalities and the performance of
cultural difference in Cameroon” in November 1997. The author thanks Mitzi
Goheen and the organizers of the panel for giving her the opportunity to initiate
this reflection. She thanks Tessy Bakary, Sara Berry, Cyprian Fisiy, Ambroise
Kom, Célestin Monga, and the late Professor Leroy Vail, for their comments on
earlier drafts.
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illustrates how the prevailing ethnic discourses coexist with a resilient sense
of Cameroonian togetherness. Most the documentary evidence used in this
paper was drawn from newspaper articles in the private Cameroon press,
which, since the days of the National Conference in the early 1990s, has
been one of the best places to take the pulse of Cameroonian society. I
have also looked at dance, painting, theatre, and comedy-arts through which
Cameroonians of divers backgrounds express themselves. As a complement
to these popular sources, I have relied on scholarly articles on similar topics
as well as my own first-hand observation of Cameroon and its political
struggles1.
A Social Injustice Experienced Across Ethnic Boundaries
In his newest music release, Petit Pays proclaimed his admiration for mem-
bers of the Bamileke ethnic group by referring to them as theMillionaires
du Cameroun. In so doing, the Douala-basedmakossa2 musician was echo-
ing a widespread belief that people from the Bamileke group are all wealthy
and involved in business. From another perspective, the musician’s state-
ment expresses the popular view that Cameroon is divided into wealthy
Bamileke and other, far poorer ethnic groups. In effect, the economic and
social gap in Cameroon is sometimes expressed in a polarized ethnicism:
the Bamileke versus the others.
The Bamileke are the largest of Cameroon’s estimated two hundred eth-
nic groups3. Given their large number, it is not surprising that there are
more wealthy people in the Bamileke group than in other groups, but there
are also more Bamileke people living in a state of poverty in the shanty-
towns of Douala4. Nor are all wealthy Cameroonians Bamileke. There-
fore, casting the pervasive experience of material deprivation and social
injustice purely in ethnic terms is an oversimplification of the country’s
1. The National Conference were a watershed moment in the political history of
much of West and Central Africa. Opposition parties of the day called for a
large national forum where civil society, as represented by political parties, non-
governmental organizations, the private press, and other associations, would
come together to create a new social contract making a total break with the old,
ossified, one-party regime. Despite government censorship, the Cameroon pri-
vate press was instrumental in echoing popular anxieties about the future of Cam-
eroon as a nation, and the need to hold a national conference (cf. EBOUSSI
BOULAGA 1993).
2. A type popular music with Duala origins. For convenience, we will write
“Duala” when referring to the ethnic group and “Douala” when referring to the
city or to last names.
3. About seven millions, that is, half the population of Cameroon. But these are
unofficial sources. The results of the last national census held in the late 1980s
were never made public. This statistical gap reveals the importance of number
in Cameroon’s domestic politics.
4. This is simply explained by the probabilistic rule of large numbers.
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complex reality. Though economic deprivation, political disenfranchisement,
and social injustice affect the vast majority of the citizens these issues are
usually and increasingly framed in ethnic terms. The question that comes
to mind, then, is what is wrong with Cameroonians? In trying to answer
this question, I suggest looking at the approach to politics embraced by
Cameroon’s first president, Ahmadou Ahidjo, and continued by his succes-
sor, Paul Biya.
Ahidjo, the founder of the Union camerounaise (Cameroonian Union)
became the first president of Cameroon in 1960, after a period of anti-
colonial unrest organized by the Union des populations du Cameroun (Union
of the Populations of Cameroon), a radical nationalist party that denounced
him as a sell-out to French interests. In 1961 British Southern Cameroons
chose by plebiscite to join French Cameroon and together they formed the
Federal Republic of Cameroon. Furthermore, Cameroon is made up of a
mosaic of ethnic groups with different cultures, social structures, and sys-
tems of belief. Then, as today, the size and density of these groups were
unequal, as were the distribution of natural resources, and the exposure to
western education and ideas. As head of the new federal republic, Ahidjo
faced the challenge of creating a country, and developing a new national
consciousness among a group of peoples with different colonial experiences,
political memories and convictions (Joseph 1977: 343-345).
Confronted with the task of reducing regional disparities and promoting
a harmonious national development, Ahidjo adopted a policy of “regional
equilibrium” (équilibre régional). The goal of achieving regional equilib-
rium was pursued through a set of government policies. First, the number
of civil servants employed by the state was greatly increased to open up
opportunities for educated Cameroonians. Second, a system of differential
standards and quotas was applied to professional and technical positions in
areas such as public health, engineering, journalism, the civil service, teach-
ing, agricultural services, and defense with the intention of reducing obvious
disparities. Candidates from “disadvantaged” regions were allowed to pass
their examinations with lower grades than those required of candidates from
“advantaged” regions. Similar quotas were used to create spaces for those
from areas with few educational facilities and to restrict spaces for those
from areas with abundant schools. In other words, the determination of
just how many candidates from each ethnic group or region should pass a
given national examination was made according to an ethnic alchemy aimed
at achieving social justice. Access to high state offices was also determined
by an ethnic equation. This means that Ahidjo’s policy of pursuing and
implementing social justice was not concerned with giving all Cameroonians
a fair chance to gain access to certain state-sponsored opportunities, but
rather with making sure that each region and “main” ethnic group in the
country had afair accessto these opportunities5. Fairness of access to
5. To some extent, Ahidjo’s policy of positive discrimination was a revisited version
of the colonists’ rule of divide and rule.
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high state positions became the main guiding principles of political action6.
The very notion of fair access was soon equated withfair distribution of
available state resources along ethnic lines. But it depended on the relative
political weight of the ethnic groups in place: the more politically significant
ethnic groups could negotiate fairly good access to these resources whereas
the others could not stand the competition.
This emphasis on regional and ethnic identities resulted in the creation
of an acute, sustained awareness of ethnic belonging and regional affilia-
tion. It also opened the gates to criticisms and disputes concerning the
distribution system itself. For example, ethnic groups perceived as already
naturally “favored” saw the quota system as an injustice and resented the
fact that their ability to expand their opportunities was fettered to “protect”
minority groups; the “disadvantaged” groups on their part lived under the
constant fear that their “places” or share might be taken away by other,
more qualified people. Tragically, people of merit from these last groups
also suffered the backlash of the quota system, because they had to bear
the condescending or suspicious gaze of all those who believed that their
success was undeserved in terms of merit7. The politics of regional equilib-
rium ingrained in the minds of Cameroonians the notion that access to state
functions and places in professional schools depended not primarily on com-
petence and merit, but instead on one’s ethnic and regional affiliations.
Consequently, Cameroon as a geographical entity began to be increasingly
perceived and represented in terms that conveyed this ethnic message: the
country was nothing but an aggregation of resources, a gigantic “pie”, to
be “fairly” distributed among ethnic groups8. They participated in the dis-
tribution through their putative “representatives” who were called to the
trough by the head of state. Despite the ethnic-based, region-oriented phi-
losophy behind the principle of regional equilibrium, Ahidjo was able to
promote and sustain a certain degree of national consciousness—or better,
national consensus—thanks to a strong political regime and an expanding
national economy that permitted him to extend his largess to various groups
on an increasing scale.
When he resigned from power in 1982, his ethnic politics were carried
on by his successor Paul Biya, who even took them several steps further.
However, Biya’s reinterpretation of regional equilibrium should be under-
stood against the backdrop of a severe economic crisis beginning in the
mid-1980s, that caused the so-called national pie to shrink and leading to
6. W. JOHNSON (1970) refers to this as “allocation of authority”.
7. Most of these critiques were expressed in 1990-1991; they were collected in an
anthology of ethnic complains (cf. COLLECTIF CHANGER LE CAMEROUN 1992).
This debate is not unique to Cameroon, for it sounds much similar to debate on
the long-term relevance of the Affirmative Action principles in the US.
8. In the same lines of analysis, F. NYAMNJOH (1999) writes that “to many people
in or seeking high office, Cameroon is little more than a farm tended by God
but harvested by man”. See also J.-F. BAYART (1993).
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the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs that resulted in
restrictive budgetary policies with massive layoffs in public functions and
state-sponsored companies. Furthermore, the restoration of multiparty poli-
tics in 1991 has undermined the political authority of Paul Biya, necessitat-
ing the reinvention of new means of achieving “popular” legitimacy.
Indeed, with Biya the idea of Cameroon as a pie has become so common
that the very notion of democratic representation needs to be revisited when
accounting for the sociopolitical innovation taking place in Cameroon.
First, the head of state is likened to the “big man”, or“big katika” 9 whose
main role is to preside over the distribution of resources, making sure that
each ethnic group receives its share of the national pie. Second, the new
political actors are now called the “elite”, either “internal” if they live in
rural areas or are traditional rulers, or “external” if they are urban dwellers.
The urban elite in this system are not considered to be representatives of
urban areas but rather of their respective putative “villages”. This is espe-
cially the case when the urban elite member is appointed to a high state
function10. Third, despite the prevalence of ethnic discourse in most politi-
cal debate in Cameroon, the real issue behind that rhetoric is not ethnic
resentmentper se, but rather “fair” distribution of state resources along
ethnic lines. Two political cartoons published in private newspapers
underscore this point of view. The first cartoon was published when Cam-
eroonians started feeling the effects of economic crisis in their “pock-
etbooks” around the mid-1980s; it showed Ahmadou Ahidjo pulling a bag
full of coins with a hole in the bottom; the coins that feel out were picked
up by passerby. Next to Ahidjo was Paul Biya, sweating and pulling a
bag of coins similar to Ahidjo’s yet bigger, yet tighter and with no hole at
all. There were also no lost coins for anyone to found. The legend simply
reads: “Ahidjo ate, but at least he left behind some scraps for us.” Thought
the cartoon critiques the differences between the two president’s implemen-
tation of the notion of regional equilibrium, it does not question the principle
itself. The cartoonist’s aim was not to question the pie policy but rather
to advocate its proper execution11.
The second cartoon dates from the beginning of 1990 and featured a
Cameroon divided into provinces, with the names of high state officials and
their positions inscribed within the provincial boundaries. It demonstrated
the acceptance of the pie policy by the majority of the Cameroonians.
9. The word “Godfather” from the Sicilianmafia is the closest concept that best
convey the idea of “Big Katika”. This expression was made popular in Camer-
oon during the late 1980s by the singer-activist, Lapiro de Mbanga, in his release,
“Mimba we”, understand “remember to share the pie with us”.
10. But the system does not always run smoothly. Nana Sinkam a high-ranked
international professional was appointed Minister of Finance by Biya. But the
man refused to take office, to the great disappointment of people of his village,
who waited in vain for the Godot to show up for the celebrations.
11. For more on political cartoons in Cameroon, see C. MONGA (1997b).
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Political cartoonists in Cameroon have taken to reconfiguring the country’s
political map after each formation of a new government (Anonym 1997a)12.
By so doing, they provide an unmediated visual support to regional claims,
while adding a graphic effect to the great variety of ethnic discourses already
dominating political debates. They also contribute to heightening the level
of ethnic awareness induced by fierce competition for diminishing state
resources. In some way, the political significance of such a representation
goes far beyond its obvious ethnic message. Cameroon, which has barely
been a nation13, would now potentially cease to exist as a geographically
entity or territory, becoming a discontinuity of coexisting physical locali-
ties. How have these localities come to be produced?
The end of the 1980s, the Fall of the Berlin Wall, French President
François Mitterand’s speech at La Baule announcing that financial aid to
his French-speaking African partners would be tied to their progress towards
democracy, all of these put pressure on the Biya government. Internally,
critiques against the Biya regime increasingly voiced publicly, especially
following the Monga and Njawe trial of February 199114. The frustration
of the population was compounded by a persistent economic crisis and
rumor of massive layoffs in the bureaucracy and state-owned companies.
Biya eventually conceded the multiparty system and even organized
multiparty elections, but he did not allow government’s institutions to func-
tion freely. Popular demands for a real democratic change and a credible
system of political accountability were met with a stubborn refusal by presi-
dent Biya. He also used his extensive executive power to impose his rules
on the legislature, the judiciary and the military and has maintained power
despite the strong discontent of the people towards his government and
his party15.
One of the gambits he used to undermine the advent of a real democratic
society was the implementation of a new mode of government based on
the concept of “village”. The notion made its first appearance in the politi-
cal lexicon of Cameroon during the presidential and legislative campaigns
12. This map was up-dated after the constitution of the new government following
the October 1997 presidential election (cf. ANOMYM 1997c).
13. Defining nation as the product of history, I suggest that widely-spread myths and
a biased official history had led to exclusion of dissident histories and historical
memories, contributing to the creation of ethnic stereotypes and hindering the
emergence of an integrating Cameroonian nation (cf. Y. MONGA 1997; MBEMBE
1992). For a general discussion on nation as a product of history, see CON-
NOR (1990).
14. Célestin Monga, wrote an open letter inLe Messager,criticizing Biya for claim-
ing that he has “given” democracy to Cameroonians while, in reality, Camerooni-
ans were still subjected to economic inequalities, maltreatment from the police
and the military, and that the parliament was only a token institution. The trial
of Monga and Njawe stirred up unrest nationwide and for the first time since
the independence, Cameroonians protested openly against the regime again.
15. It is not sure that the 92,37% ballots cast in favor of Biya during the last presiden-
tial (non)election really reflect the scope of his popularity in the entire country.
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of 1992 and was articulated by law professor Roger-Gabriel Nlep of the
University of Yaounde. In a televised debate Prof. Nlep argued that Camer-
oon politics have functioned on the basis of an “equilateral triangle” formed
by three geopolitical regions dominated by three main ethnic groups: the
North and the Muslim Fulani, the South and the Beti, and the West and
the Bamileke. According to Nlep, these three ethnic groups had dominated
the political and socio-economic life of Cameroon since independence to
the exclusion of all others16. Therefore, for the others ever to have a chance
to play a part in the political game, candidates for office should henceforth
campaign and run for elections in their own “electoral village”17. A handful
of politicians soon articulated their support for this idea; the “village solu-
tion” was also perceived as an antidote to the so-called Bamileke’s threat;
that is the fear by other groups that the Bamileke people, who already had
a large presence in the economic sector and were very often migrants
throughout the country might also grab political power. The principle of
the electoral village was then applied not only to electoral seats, but to access
to high state services as well. Consequently, people appointed to high posi-
tions soon saw their appointments not as recognition of their merit and
personal value but rather as the head of state’s generous response to their
villages’ complaints. Commenting on his appointment, for example, the
new director of the National Security declared that it was an indication that
“the head of state paid great attention to the complaints of the populations
of the Sanaga Maritime Division. The Babimbi sector had needed a Minister
for a long time; and now it is all set” (Tagne 1997a: 9).
Presidential appointments instantly transform new appointees into their
villages’ representatives and make them spokespersons fortheir popula-
tions; the latter are then requested by these spokespersons to express politi-
cal support of the president as payback. These marks of gratitude are
expressed in several different ways: promises to combat the influence of
opposition parties in the rural areas; great publicity about “motions of sup-
port” sent to the president; and promises to vote overwhelmingly for the
president and his party’s candidates in all upcoming elections. One of the
main purposes of this politicalmise en scèneput in place in early 1990s was
to oppose a counter claim of grassroots support to the claim of widespread
unpopularity denounced by opposition parties. But it also served to cloud
the reality of political alienation experienced by the masses and rural pop-
ulations in particular18. These motions of support partake of a cult-of-
16. For an assessment of geo-political “allocation of authority” in postcolonial Cam-
eroon up during Ahidjo’s reign, see NGAYAP (1983).
17. Asked whether the electoral village should be a native or adoptive village, Nlep
attempted to qualify his idea, suggesting that it could well be an adoptive village.
But he emphasized warnings against hypocrites who, while claiming to represent
their village of adoption would be defending in reality the interests of their native
village. His readers could easily guess what he really thinks the electoral village
should be. For further details and references on this issue, see NKOT (1998).
18. A notable and increasing segment of urban masses, who were the main actors
of the political turmoil during 1990-1994 have shifted their attention away from
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personality tradition common to one-party andde factoone-party systems
in Africa and elsewhere. Most importantly, the principle of the electoral
village ultimately instituted a complex game of give and take: first, between
the president astate resources provideron the one hand and the villages
and their representatives asrural ballot providers on the other; second,
between the village representatives asstate resource mediators,and their
village populations asrural constituencies;and, lastly between the president
again asstate resources providerand the village representatives asrural
ballots mediators. This arrangement is clearly demonstrated in the following
examples. After his appointment, a village representative declared in an
interview that his “ambition [was] to make the Sanaga Maritime [an admin-
istrative division] a political fiefdom of the RDPC [Cameroonian Popular
and Democratic Party, henceforth CPDM]... and make sure that it will win
all local elections” (Tagne 1997b: 9). Another one expressed in a speech
his deep gratitude to the president for appointing him to the Central Commit-
tee of the ruling party and promised him his “permanent, total and uncondi-
tional support” (Endalle 1997a: 5). Showing his satisfaction upon receiving
a brand new medical facility from a village representative, a chief, speaking
for the rural constituency, declared:
“We had already scored 100% in favor of the CPDM during the Municipal campaign
and with no condition attached. Since there are others elections coming up, we
will vote 98% for the CPDM, because I reserve 2% of the votes to the opposition
parties. After all, Bassamba is cosmopolitan village” (Anonym 1997b: 9).
Whether or not this chief is actually in the position to force his fellow
villagers to vote for the CPDM is not the issue. The point, rather, is that
the recent transfer of the focus of national politics to the villages has pro-
vided the rural elite with a new sense of political empowerment19. Only
such a sense of empowerment can explain for example why some village
leaders felt that they could travel to Etoudi, the site of the presidential
palace, to express their disappointments and demand a better “place” for
their village representatives after a series of appointments (Atangana 1997:
10). It also explains why they would withhold their public statement of
political activism to economic survival. Professionals are more concerned with
company privatization, downsizing, and career redirection than signing petitions
or attending political gatherings. Following the severe loans conditionalities of
international donors and development agencies, civil servants aware of their pre-
carious status are more anxious than ever to “eat where they are tethered”, that
is to amass as much wealth as can and as soon as possible before an eventual
layoff. For more on village and electoral politics in Cameroon, see the vol. 68 (3)
of Africa, 1998.
19. This development underpins to some extent the critique formulated against the
“urban bias” theories, that it does not take enough into consideration politics,
but analyses the relationships between the rural and urban sectors only in eco-
nomic terms (cf. VARSNEY 1993). For more on a critical assessment of the links
between cities and villages see TRAGER (1998).
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support until they obtained from the president an assurance that their repre-
sentative would remain “in place” (Anonym 1996a: 5). Furthermore, mater-
ial resources in the forms of cash or various form of equipment received
from the urban elite in theory benefit the whole village. But one must
stress that ordinary village dwellers are not reaping the same profits as the
rural elite is from the new trend (Mahatma 1997: 3). There is no con-
vergence of interests among village populations just because they all dwell
in villages; instead, the convergence of interests operates at the top level
between the urban and the rural elites working hand in hand. This also
means that, despite instances of strong ethnic hostility such as the rallies
organized against the Bamileke by the Duala in February 1997, the current
social and political problems of Cameroon cannot be explained in ethnic
terms, alone.
Indeed, the politics of ethnicity in Cameroon are substantially more com-
plex than simple anti-Bamileke protests and indicate at least two classes of
top actors: (1) a cross-ethnic urban elite sharing common political and eco-
nomic interests; and, within each ethnic group, (2) a handful of urban and
rural elite working for their mutual benefit. The point here is that ethnic
bonding does not supersede class affiliation, as illustrated recently by the
case of Souop Lazare, a working tailor and a militant of an opposition party,
the Social Democratic Front (SDF). During the 1996 municipal election,
Souop was elected mayor in Douala III, one of the city’s five municipali-
ties. But was never able to occupy that position because the leadership of
the SDF wanted him to leave the post and toappointas the mayor a Duala
native who had just joined the party. Souop refused to yield and as result
was ousted from the SDF. This incidence was significant because Souop
Lazare was only one of four Bamileke elected mayor in Douala. But as
a “simple tailor”, he lacked the political connections, economic power, and
high social status enjoyed by his other Bamileke counterparts (Zanga Zanga
1997: 2). Thus, though members of a different ethnic groups, the well-
connected Bamileke mayors belonged to the same social class and shared
the same interests as any other member of the Duala elite: in this case,
class solidarity superseded ethnic loyalty. Furthermore, despite the fact that
the SDF had promised “radical” changes in Cameroon’s politics and had
been (until now) one of the opposition parties unwilling to compromise with
the Biya regime, this incident demonstrated that it was no less involved in
“village” politics than the more “moderate” opposition parties. In invoking
the principle of the electoral village to change the result of the ballot box,
the SDF clearly demonstrated that it was still limited in its aspiration for
drastic change and vision for the country’s future20.
Along with the recasting of national politics in apparent ethnic and rural
terms, there has been an ever-stronger intertwining of the political and eco-
nomic spheres. This intermingling has taken the form of the personalization
20. For more on the SDF, see TAKOUGANG & K RIEGER (1998).
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of taxation, utility bill collection21, reimbursement of bank loans, payment
of customs duties, grants of import monopolies, trade licenses, public con-
tracts, and so on. In reality, this phenomenon is not new, but it has been
greatly enhanced by the recent process of privatization. Throughout the
country, businessmen are getting involved in politics to secure their eco-
nomic assets while politicians and state officials are using the authority and
the hindsight derived from their state position to develop a business portfo-
lio. And this is just another form of state corruption. This situation exemp-
lifies what observers of the African political scene have already denounced
as the “criminalization” of the state (Bayarte al. 1999; Péan 1988). New
social actors calledfeymen, a category of con-men involved in all sorts of
international traffic, have appeared.Feymenusually appear on the eco-
nomic scene overnight as wealthy “businessmen”, though little is actually
known about their exact activities. In general, they do not belong to the
presidentialentouragebut are politically well connected. They are recog-
nized by their flashy lifestyle and easy money (Kala Lobe 1997: 11). They
also set an example for a substantial segment of the younger population.
For all these reasons, the emergence of thefeymenmight well signal a
new departure in the country’s political and social life. Politically, their
acquaintance with the circles of power indicates that Cameroon might be
moving to a greater level of state criminality. Socially the tolerance, if not
the popularity offeymen, poses serious questions with respect to the value
standards of Cameroonian society especially as many Cameroonians victims
of feymenconfidence’s schemes were otherwise respectable citizens who
yielded to their lust for easy money.
The increased importance of village affiliation and rural constituency in
Cameroon’s politics has resulted in the reconfiguration of ethnic and village
boundaries to fit the political ambitions of the moment. Ethno-politicians
have emerged also as culture brokers. They are defining new identities,
inventing new cultural practices, and manipulating the content of existing
cultural institutions in an attempt to substantiate their ethnic-based politics.
Political Reconfigurations of Ethnic and Village Boundaries
The geographical boundaries of ethnic groups in Cameroon have been char-
acterized by their fluidity and ability to respond to changes in the overall
national sociopolitical and economic context. During his twenty five year
reign, Ahidjo had the power to interpret Cameroon ethnic terms in ways
that fit his political agenda, and he alone designed the configuration of geo-
ethnic divisions on the political chessboard. These divisions reflected his
21. Taxation as a political weapon is not a state-only practice. During the apex of
social and political turmoil of 1991-1992, the non payment of taxes and utilities
bills was considered as significant political acts of civil disobedience; so was
the non respect of traffic lights...
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own view of the significant political forces at work in Cameroon then and
provided the framework for his policy of regional equilibrium. Besides the
labels of specific ethnic groups such as Bamileke, Beti, Bassa, Baya, Fulani,
Bafia, or Duala inherited from the colonial ethnography, polarized terms
such as “Nordists” and “Sudists” “Anglophones” and “Francophones”, and
even Christians and Muslims were constructed and made to serve as quasi-
ethnic labels. The novelty introduced in this process by Paul Biya was to
“democratize” ethnic labeling by moving the center of production of such
definition to local political entrepreneurs and culture brokers who have acted
simultaneously in two apparently contradictory ways, at a regional and
local levels.
At a regional level, the project of ethnic reconfiguration has followed
a logic of expansion. Considering the overall context of competition for
bigger shares of the national pie, politicians depicting themselves as socio-
cultural engineers used a discourse of regional integration aimed at “recruit-
ing” “allies” from neighboring groups sharing cultural similarities with their
own ethnic group (Geschiere & Gugler 1998). It is argued that while each
will maintain its political autonomy, they should come together as aggre-
gated entity and stress their common cultural identity. This has occurred
to some extent with the group called “Beti”, which has been expanded to
include ethnic groups like the Boulou, the Ewondo, the Eton, the Bafia,
and the Baya who were previously seen as distinct ethnic groups. The Beti
group is also called, derisively thePays organisateur(Host Country), an
expression imported from the soccer field to the political arena in order to
express the common Cameroonian idea that a country hosting an interna-
tional soccer event cannot afford to “lose” the game. Put differently, since
Paul Biya belongs to the Beti group, the latter are “entitled” to the best
portions of the country’s assets.
The recent political prominence gained by the concept of Sawa identity
provides another example of the expansion of ethnic frontiers. The denomi-
nation “Bonasawa” (sawa meaning coast andbona people of) or “Sawa”
subsumes all the ethnic groups dwelling in the Cameroonian littoral zones
and includes the Bakossi, the Bakweri, the Balong, the Abo, the Bassa-
Bakoko, the Babimbi, the Batenga, the Bodiman, the Yabassi, the Banen,
the Duala, the Bojongo, and the Jebale. These various groups have been
aggregated into one global society, the Coastal Bantu, who are conceived
of as being in opposition to the people living in the forest, the desert, or
the hinterland regions. The Coastal Bantu thus are defined as “People of
Water” in contrast with the “People of Land”. Yet another new ethnic
identity in the Cameroon politics is that of “Grassfield”. Originally applied
primarily to the Bamileke ethnic group, this label has been expanded to
encompass all the populations living on the high plateaus of western Camer-
oon, including Anglophones from the North-Western province and Bamileke
Francophones from the Western provinces. The new expression “Anglo-
Bami” has been coined for these groups; it renders the space of their ethnic-
ity and also illustrates the new political and ethnic dynamic.
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A trickier, and potentially more peace threatening “ethnic” denomination
in contemporary Cameroon politics is that of “Anglophone”22. Linguisti-
cally, the term appears clear, seemingly designating a person with some
degree of familiarity with English culture. But in reality, the domain of
“anglophony” and the frontiers of “Anglophoneness” are less clear-cut than
one might think. Anglophone is actually applied to all Cameroonian natives
of the South and North-Western provinces regardless of their actual dwelling
place or familiarity with the English language23. It therefore refers to a
space historically marked by a British presence and corresponds to the for-
mer territories of Southern Cameroons. But yet again, this spatial definition
is not enough for the Cameroonian administration and poses a special “tech-
nical” problem. “Francophone” Cameroonians whose parents migrated to
that part of the country during the colonial period as workers on European
plantations, as political refugees fleeing the civil wars in the 1950s (Michel
1970; Ardener 1960; Stoecker 1960), or who moved there more recently
for personal reasons are not recognized the status of “real” Anglophones
by either the administration or the Anglophone “natives”. This can be
explained in terms of the increased competition for diminishing state
resources which has forced ethnic politicians to pay greater heed to ethnic
origin and the “village”. Because the children of “Francophone immi-
grants” in Anglophone provinces can also claim a tribal and a village affilia-
tion besides their Anglophone status, this raises question about their actual
loyalty. Consequently, they find themselves in an awkward position: while
they are not recognized as of “Anglophones” by local people, they are also
not recognized as “Francophones” in their parents’ “province of origin”.
This “social” ambivalence put these outsider Francophone Cameroonians in
a sort of “ethnicimpasse”, a dead end with which they have attempted to
deal by adopting a new self-identity: the “Eleventh Province” (Geschiere
& Gugler 1998: 313-314). Cameroon has only ten administrative provinces,
and this denomination was purposely employed to emphasize the particulari-
ty—and peculiarity—of this category of Cameroonians. According to Cilas
Kemedjio, the members of the Eleventh Province are actually the only ones
deserving the name of “Cameroonians”: as they do not belong to any of
the existing administrative divisions, their real sphere of definition and the
only one available to them, is therefore the nation of Cameroon itself. This
point of view is highlighted by the fact that members of the “Eleventh
Province” come from all different parts of the country (Kemedjio 1997).
But in any case, the Anglophone (or Francophone) label does not suppress
22. For a long time the “Anglophone problem” was addressed by Anglophone schol-
ars alone. Only in 1992, was it addressed publicly by a Francophone in an
interview. Julius Wamey, a TV journalist mentioned the piece in a segment of
popular TV program: he was swiftly sanctioned and ended up in exile. The “A”
question has since become banal, though more acute (cf. JUNBAM 1992).
23. These remarks are true for the concept of Francophone.
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ethnic affiliation and label. It only adds to the instability and complexity
of cultural identification in the interplay of ethnicity and politics.
The process of the enlargement of ethnic territory requires further a
comment from an historical perspective. Despite the new political signifi-
cance attached to them, new ethnic entities are rooted in, or built upon,
actual pre-existing cultural similarities among the groups being lumped
together. But the underlying idea of the current “ethnic renaissance” merits
some attention. For example, the concept “Grassfield” really corresponds
to an identifiable cultural area extending approximately from the southern
edge of the high plateaus to the Tikar plain in the north. So also is the
case with the “Sawa” group. As cultural signifier, the concept of Sawa is
rooted in the precolonial and colonial histories of the people of Cameroon’s
coastal area from Rio del Rey to Campo in the south. The opposition
between the coast and the hinterland recalls the historical division of the
Wouri estuary between the shore(mundongo)and the bush(koto), literally
meaning “barrier”, two different landscapes referring to two distinctive
social categories: the free Duala(wonja) of the shore and the domestic
slaves(bakom)of the interior. In the same way, the notion of “Beti” can
be comprehended as a sub-group belonging culturally to the larger Pahouin
group which extents from the south-central Cameroon into the neighboring
Republics of Gabon, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea24. Other ethnic denom-
inations forming the Cameroonian mosaic could, in the same way be
replaced in a more or less recent historical context.
The novelty with the current ethnic process(ing) is that it is triggered by
contemporary political and economical circumstances. I argue that political
engineers have selected terms from a pool of equally valid cultural data
that best suit their current political goals so as to produce the desired ethnic
alliances: it is the shore area and water deities for the “Sawa”; the forest
location and the Fang-Pahouin ethnicity for the “Beti”; the high plateaus
and the institution of chieftaincy for the “Grassfield” groups; the British
colonial experience for the “Anglophones”, and so on. While having some
justification, these criteria and ethnic reconfigurations are not the only ones
imaginable. For there are equally sound cultural grounds to imagine in
Cameroon a large Bantu group with “Sawa” and “Beti”, a Proto-Bantu or
Semi-Bantu group with the Bamileke, and a non-Bantu group with Pygmies,
Fulani, and Sudanic; or a group of “People of the Forest” with the Baya and
the Pygmies versus non-Forest dwellers; or “acephalous” societies versus
“chiefly” societies, and so on. The point I am trying to make here is that
24. Differences within the Pahouin ensemble are marked by the extent to which the
ewondo language has affected the dialect of each individual sub-group. Thus,
the languages of members of the Pahouin groups such as the Bulu, Fan, Ntumu,
or Yebekolo are less affected by the ewondo, than those of the “Beti” group
such as the Ewondo, Tsingua, Mbamvele, Eton, Bane whose dialects are close
to the ati, the language of the Ewondo; Hence the term Beti’ ascribed to
these groups.
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the reconfiguration of ethnic frontiers is a selective, arbitrary, and hence a
political process because it depends on particular political situations. In
this respect, it is instructive that the labels “Muslims” and “Christians” and
the polarity between Nordists and Sudists, so prevalent during Ahidjo’s
regime, have lost almost all their political and cultural significance.
Depending on the circumstances, political engineers choose to emphasize
one cultural characteristic over another to satisfy the needs of the moment.
But there is a problem with articulating economic and political goals in
cultural terms, because the two arenas are not perfectly congruent. Thus,
Jean-Jacques Ekindi, a Sawa of the Duala group with political ambition of
his own, denounced the appointment of Peter Mafany Musongo, a Sawa of
the Bakwari ethnic group, to the position of Prime Minister on no solid
ground, except perhaps for the fact that Mafany Musongo was not a Duala:
among politicians, broad ethnic solidarity does not hold long in the face of
local identity and conflicting interests. Furthermore, the figure of Mafany
Musongo stands as a telling example of the multiple and complex layers
of new identities being deployed in Cameroon: a Bakweri, a Sawa, a Camer-
oonian from the South-West province, an Anglophone, and a high-ranked
member of the CPDM all together, Mafany Musongo is simultaneously
engaged with different cultural and ethnic categories that have conflicting
interests at times. Ironically, the cultural flexibility that has enabled politi-
cians to select their allies to suit the needs of the moment has also made
the new ethnic alliances subject to change when tensions arise over decreased
access to state resources. This situation poses a constant threat to the sta-
bility of the pattern of ethnic aggregation and perhaps explains the impor-
tance attached to performances of cultural unity as a means of blurring the
reality of cultural diversities and regional competition.
In effect, because of the precarious nature of the new ethnic combina-
tions, politicians have attempted assiduously to stabilize ethnic frontiers
through cultural performances aimed at promoting images of ethnic and
cultural unity and at emphasizing claims of unique ethnic identity. Such
performances take form and are expressed in “cultural” associations. Among
the Bamileke political entrepreneurs, theLa’akam plays such a role. The
La’akam designates the sacred place where Bamileke chiefs and deputy
chiefs are initiated to the secrets of their new functions during a forty day
period of seclusion (Harter n.d.). A powerful symbol of Bamileke culture,
it is now used by some of their political activists and culture brokers to
construct and project the image of a united or unified Bamileke “bloc”
politically opposed to other ethnic groups. Yet, despite the cultural similar-
ities of the various Bamileke sub-groups, the very existence of individual
and differentLa’akam throughout the Bamileke high plateaus is actually
indicative of the political independence of each chiefdom. This reality runs
contrary to the message of political unity for which the reinterpretedLa’a-
kam is supposed to stand as symbol. A similar observation can be made
with regard to theEssigan,the “cultural” association of the Beti people
SPACE, CULTURE, POLITICS IN CAMEROON 737
which had played a political role in pre-independent Cameroon. The term
“essigan” is the name given a species of tree from the rainforest; it is sup-
posed to emblemize the strength of the Beti as a group. Yet, the Beti are
not organized in chiefdoms, but in lineage groups, a fact that belies from
the outset the new claim of political unity expressed by the Beti culture
brokers. Like its Bamileke counterpart, theEssigan“cultural” association
does not correspond to an actual unity among the Beti. Like the redefined
La’akam, theEssiganfunctions as a political lobbying group for some mem-
bers of the “Beti” group in the matrix of the new Cameroon political
discourse.
The Sawa of the coast, on their part, have taken up the institution and
the celebration of the Ngondo festival as an affirmation of their cultural
identity and political unity. Originally however, the Ngondo was not an
instrument of inclusion, but of social distinction between the Duala groups
and non-Duala. Indeed, the high point of the Ngondo festival is marked
by the Njengu celebration, the cult of the water spirits(miengu).Yet, in
the Duala history,Njengu was a closed society reserved for “free” Duala
only; even Duala from the Akwa clan were initially not admitted to partici-
pate therein, on the ground that the mother of their ancestor Ngando Kwa
was a Basa native25. The presently conceived Ngondo as symbol of the
political unity of the newly defined Sawa people owes little to history.
Tellingly, the description of the Ngondo has been changed from “Assembly
of the Duala People” (Wei 1999; Austen 1992; Doumbe Moulongo 1972;
Harter 1958) to “Assembly of the Sawa Populations” (Ndoumbe 1997).
This redefinition accounts for the broader membership of the Ngondo while
also reflecting its contemporary message and agenda of political unity. The
fact that the “new Ngondo” is celebrated nationwide, even with water, its
key signifying element missing, is further testimony of the changed nature
of the present “cultural” performance.
The “Anglophone” identity is not built on any historical mythology or
ancestral tradition. But is rooted in the shared experience of the British
colonial administration. This is best expressed in the creation of the South-
ern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). By appealing to the experience
of British colonialism, Anglophone political activists have tried to construct
a common identity which articulates itsproblématique explicitly and
directly in political terms without cultural pretenses or rhetoric. Their polit-
ical agenda is also clear from the outset: regional separation. In this sense,
the discourse of the SCNC partakes of, and contributes to, the general diat-
ribe around the concepts of space and local identity. By advocating politi-
cal separation, it only adds an ominous overtone to current concerns about
the future survival of Cameroon as a nation.
25. For this reason, the Bonanjo called the Akwa people “Banaku bakom”, meaning
that “people from Akwa are slaves”.
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Simultaneously, another process of ethnic reconfiguration follows a
logic of contraction. Here, ethnic boundaries are narrowly drawn along
village lines according to the principle of the electoral village. Concretely,
the politics of the electoral village means that during elections high state
officials and urban elite leave their offices and urban homes and head to
their respective villages to raise support for CPDM candidates. In presiden-
tial campaigns their assignment is to obtain votes for the President and
counter the influence of opposition parties. In legislative elections the prin-
ciple of the electoral village implies that candidates run to represent their
respective native villages in the National Assembly, regardless of their
actual place of residence. The “village” provision holds different conse-
quences for different categories of Cameroonians. Only a few significant
cases will be highlighted here. First of all, it poses a real challenge to
Cameroonians of “the Eleventh Province” since they are less likely than
others to have social networks and attachments in their parents’ “villages
of origin”. Their chances of winning a legislative election are substantially
limited. Second, the electoral village provision forces full-time urban poli-
ticians into seasonal rural migrations to their villages during legislative—and
presidential—election campaigns. Third, the mid- and long-term effects of
this trend for rural candidates are yet to be fully appreciated26. Since, the
“people from towns” are likely to enjoy greater financial means and
extended political networks than their rural opponents, one cannot but won-
der whether the latter could effectively be able to compete against them,
whether this imbalance would lead to cooperation or to rivalry between the
two elite groups. At this stage, however, it seems that the new development
has led to an increasing intertwining of local and national politics. On the
one hand, many of the newly elected deputies (and mayors) belong to the
successful urban elite, who are using their rural constituencies as stepping
stones to acquire greater national visibility and claim political legitimacy.
On the other hand, the internal rural elite, are using their electoral ballot
to squeeze material resources from the urban elite through political deal-
making.
At a different level of analysis, the relocation of legislative politics to
the village contributes to the numbers game and ethnic alchemy that have
26. This reminds of the expression “vacanciers”, “home leavers” used in many West
African countries to ridicule would-be presidents who normally work and reside
in the USA or in Europe, and take a home leave during elections to run for
presidency. This phenomenon emerged together with the National Conference
when “technocrats” Prime Ministers were needed to redress malfunctioning eco-
nomics; among them: Edem Kodjo in Togo, Nicéphore Soglo in Benin, Alassane
Ouatara in Ivory Coast, André Milongo in the Congo Republic. Some of them
were even elected presidents. But old-fashioned politicians quickly came back
to power with the second tide of presidential elections in the mid-1990s, thus
demonstrating that “technocracy” was only a parenthesis in the political life of
those African countries. A situation that political scientists have yet to help
us understand.
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ruled Cameroonian sociopolitical life since Ahidjo’s time. This has special
significance for the Bamileke politicians. In effect, the village provision
can be construed as an electoral version of the quota system instituted earlier
in the system of national examinations. For Cameroonian policymakers,
this provision is used to make sure that local candidates will obtain a legisla-
tive seat, especially if they belong to a minority ethnic group, thereby pre-
venting candidates from a demographically large ethnic group from running
against them. The assumption underlying such thinking is that ballots
should be cast not on the basis of ideas, but of ethnic affiliations. If one
pushes the logic a step further, it appears that the electoral village provision
affects primarily the political prospects of the numerous Bamileke people.
First, it prevents Bamileke candidates from running for legislative elections
in big cities such as Douala and Yaounde where most of them are estab-
lished and carry on their businesses. Second, it forces would-be Bamileke
politicians to seek legislative seats in the confines of their densely populated
high plateau. In effect, the electoral village provision can be interpreted
ultimately as a stratagem aimed at preventing Bamileke’s alleged political
influence from spreading all over the country. Third, this policy has
another, yet more subtle, impact on a strictly local Bamileke politics. In
effect, the odds are great that Bamileke villages exist in which more than
one member of their urban elite have political ambitions. This means that
the greater number of political candidates running for a relatively limited
number of seats within the confines of narrow village boundaries will check
one other. To sum up, the electoral village provision has meant fierce
internal competition among the Bamileke urban elite and has tended to
undermine the discourse of Bamileke unity27.
The pressure among the Bamileke has resulted in the creation of new
territorial units in the high plateaus. Indeed, to satisfy the political ambi-
tions of his influential Bamileke supporters while meeting his own electoral
needs, President Biya has carved out new administrative districts and rural
municipalities. They provide the urban elite with a “village” anchorage
which serves to substantiate their claims of representing something or some-
one in the rural areas. Indeed, the mayors and deputies of these new elec-
toral “villages” are, not coincidentally, usually successful urban businessmen
or state officials with close ties to the regime28. The new administrative
27. For instances of elite competition in other ethnic groups, see EYOH (1998).
28. Thus, the Division of Koung-Khi created in 1992 is financially sponsored by
Victor Fotso, a wealthy Bamileke Businessman who has also been mayor of the
new rural municipality of Pete since 1996. One of his daughters ran for the
1996 legislative election to represent Koung-Khi at the National Assembly. The
late Pierre Tchanque, President of the Cameroon Chamber of Commerce, was
also the CPDM mayor of the new rural municipality of Bazou, his village.
Several other members of the Bamileke urban elite also hold an elected positions
either as mayor or deputy in their distant villages. François Njele, the former
president of the Cameroon Federation of Cycling, is now mayor of Bandja, his
rural village; Alphonse Siyam Siwe, a former member of Biya’s Cabinet and
current Director of the Cameroon’s Port Authority is also deputy of distant Haut-
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and municipal units created by Biya in the Bamileke high plateaus exist as
so as many political fiefdoms granted to his supporters in order to counter
the influence of rival political parties in a region perceived as the seat of
the opposition.
Finally, the politics of the electoral village is indicative of a profound
and increased intertwining of the urban and rural cultural repertoires in the
postcolonial state. Concretely, this is illustrated by the fact that more and
more politicians today are appealing to “traditional” institutions of authority
as a means of providing political legitimacy in the new paradigm. As men-
tioned earlier, the village has already become the new focus of political
discourse and practice. At a more symbolic level, the movement of the
village to the forefront of national politics is expressed in multiple perfor-
mances of rural identity and village affiliation: initiations into village-based
closed societies, the adoption of traditional titles of nobility, and so on29.
In so doing, politicians expect to translate these signs of symbolic (rural)
capital into actual (urban) political gains, eventually exploitable economi-
cally. A cursory observation of Cameroon’s political scene indicates the
presence of princes, notables, chiefs, and other “traditional” elite figures of
all varieties and degrees of “authenticity”. A prime example of this trend
toward the ruralization of national political discourse is the political trajec-
tory of Célestin Bedzigui, founder of the Parti d’alliance libérale (Party of
Liberal Alliance, henceforth PAL). Bedzigui’s party was made up of a
handful of young, urban professionals recruited among his pals (no irony
intended) whose lifestyle and mindset were removed from those of the ordi-
nary working poor or village dwellers30. Bedzigui’s political activism and
moderate “opposition”31 to Biya won him an appointment as Director of
the Sacheries du Cameroun, a state-owned plan that manufactured packaging
supplies. The company did not survive his appointment and went into
bankruptcy. Bedzigui was forced to resignation. After having waited in
vain for another appointment, he finally decided to dissolve his party and
join a larger organization, the Union nationale pour la démocratie et le
progrès (National Union for Democracy and Progress, henceforth UNDP)
in 1996. In the process, the former president-founder of the once city-
oriented, Douala-based PAL also adopted a new social identity, since he
now refers to himself asNotable Beti(Beti Notable).
Nkam. André Sohaing, a well-known Douala-based businessman is also the
mayor of his rural Bayangam village.
29. For more on that issue, see FISIY & GOHEEN (1998).
30. PAL supporters were known for wearing preferably stylish English tailored shoes
as sign of distinction.
31. Casting himself in the self-serving role of “responsible” opposition, Bedzigui
supported Biya candidacy during the 1992 presidential elections while denounc-
ing the “irresponsibility” of political parties advocating the convocation of a
National Sovereign Conference.
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Bedzigui’s self-labeling is indicative of a profound shift in his political
strategy. But it also highlights the two related tropes in current Cameroon
politics: village and ethnicity. Indeed, Bedzigui has played the “village
card” with Paul Biya by appealing to his rural roots to stake a claim to
village representation and political legitimacy: “He [Paul Biya] knows quite
well that the populations of the Lekie for whom I can objectively speak
today have been abandoned” (quoted by Akam 1997: 7). He has played
the “ethnic card” with the UNDP leadership: Bedzigui’s decision to join
that particular party was not an act of pure coincidence, or even ideological
conviction, but should be read against the backdrop of the ethnic alchemy
that has guided the policy of “national integration” for decades. Indeed, as
a “Beti” (like the president) political opponent in a northern-based, Fulani-
dominated party, Bedzigui can count on the principle of ethnic equilibrium
to boost his declining political career by opening a special place for him.
In reality, the current political commerce between the villages and the
cities, with its emphasis on the rural and the urban processes of political
legitimization, are not a novelty in Cameroonian politics. President Biya
set the trend himself when he came to power in 1982 by bringing his hitherto
unknown native village of Nvomeka’a to national attention and by making
it the unofficial center of Cameroonian political life after the failed coup
against his regime in 1984. As a newly “appointed” president he also
toured the country, collecting “traditional” titles and insignias of nobility
and becoming initiated into closed societies nationwide. During his reign,
Biya has mixed repertoires of legitimacy and authority from the countryside
with categories provided by the outside world (Masonry, Rosicrucianism,
and even Christian and Muslim religions), blending together the village and
the town, the mundane and the spiritual, in the same thirst for more politi-
cal power.
Popular Culture as a Space of Mutual Ethnic Acceptance?
Inaugurated by Ahmadou Ahidjo, the policy of regional equilibrium has
ultimately led to the widespread and serial production of local identities in
Cameroon. This follows two complementary patterns: at a regional level
it tends to expand the geographic frontiers of ethnic identities, while at the
village level, it focuses on delineating the boundaries of political fiefdoms
among influential members of the urban elite in the name of “tradition”.
This process has de-emphasized the concept of Cameroon both as a geo-
graphical entity and as a nation, called into question the idea of a common
Cameroonian citizenship, and emphasized ascriptive local identities and
regional associations. The emergence in the political lexicon of such con-
cepts asautochtones, allogènes,or étrangersillustrates this trend. The
aim of the autochtony provision was allegedly to protect ethnic “minorities”;
however, the Cameroonian legislators neglected clearly to define the key
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concept of “autochtones”, and what it actually entails from a geographical,
historical, and genealogical perspective. How far back in time should one
travel to determine whothe first settlers on a given piece of land really
were? Which historical benchmarks should be used to determine the “end”
of centuries-long population migrations ? Which genealogical affiliation
matters in settling land claims? Which mode of acquisition guarantied land
rights? And which types of land right for that matter? None of these
questions were addressed or envisioned by the legislators. In the context
of current relations in Cameroon, such an imprecision could lead to deadly
conflicts. Even more disturbing than this legislative oversight is the failure
of opposition leaders to debate this arbitrary provision which could be a
cause for national outrage.
Professional politicians have thus manipulated the concept of ethnicity
and cultural identity to shore up their political base and advance their
careers32. On the other hand, some Cameroonians artists have drawn upon
the country’s cultural diversity to enrich their work. In the process they
have presented the public with a counter-vision of society that marks an
ideological break with the dominant political discourse. Donny Eldwood
is one such artist who has used popular culture as a vehicle of mutual ethnic
acceptance, and respect of human dignity. His song tellingly entitled “Mon-
sieur le Pygmée” is worth quoting extensively.
Ratatiné et le nez épaté
Vous avez deviné je suis pygmée...
Je suis né sous un grand palétuvier
Mes dents ont aussitôt été taillées
Pour mieux croquer du gibier boucané
Car un pygmée c’est un grand carnassier
Rien n’a changé depuis l’antiquité
Dans la civilisation des pygmées...
La forêt c’est notre univers sacré
Nous y vivons notre authenticité...
A
`
moitié nus sous les palétuviers
Pour ne pas ressembler aux sangliers
Qui promènent toute leur nudité
Les écorces cachent notre intimité...
Quand un “civilisé” vient voir un pygmée
C’est quand son poste est déjà menacé
C’est quand sa femme veut déjà divorcer
C’est quand il veut déjà être nommé...
C’est quand un match de foot veut être gagné
32. Cameroonian politicians do not hold the monopoly of this practice. Members
of the ruling party in Ivory Coast may soon surpass them with their dubious
concept of “Ivoirité” (state of being Ivoirian?), which is the dividing line between
those who can legally run a political party and those who cannot...
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C’est là qu’on pense à moi monsieur le pygmée
Je suis sûr d’une seule réalité...
Les vrais civilisés ce sont les pygmées
Je suis pygmée et je reste pygmée...33
The Pygmies are one of the most neglected minority groups in Cameroon.
They lack social visibility as well as political significance. Though the
majority of Cameroonians have never seen a Pygmy, most of them use that
term to ridicule short people. The celebration of pygmy ethnic identity by
Donny Elwood is therefore significant in several ways. First, his song help
raise the average Cameroonian’s awareness of the Pygmies as social group.
Second, Elwood’s Pygmy character, who addresses himself asMon ieurand
claims the status of a “civilized person”, makes a conscious attempt to estab-
lish a self-defined social identity, and more importantly, counter the pre-
vailing stereotypes about Pygmies34. Finally, the fact that Donny Elwood
himself is not a Pygmy stands as a powerful statement of the role that
popular artists play in shaping a public space of mutual ethnic acceptance
in Cameroon.
But Elwood is not an isolated case. Considered from a political stand-
point, the celebration of local identities in Cameroon has served to divide
different ethnic groups. Yet from a cultural perspective, Cameroonian art-
ists and art promoters have succeeded in using cultural difference to produce
33. Shrunken and flat nosed,
You guessed it, I’m a Pygmy
No sooner was I born under a big mangrove tree
Than I grew sharp teeth
The better to bite into smoked game
“cause a Pygmy’s” a tremendous carnivore
Nothing’s changed since antiquity
In Pygmy’s culture
The forest’s our sacred universe
That’s where we live out our authenticity
Half naked under the mangrove trees
So as not to look like boars
Who go around stark naked
Bark covers our private parts
When a “civilized” man comes to see a Pygmy
It’s when his job is in jeopardy
When his wife already wants a divorce
When he already wants an appointment
When a soccer match needs to be won
That’s when he thinks of me, Mr. Pygmy
I am sure of a single truth
The truly civilized are Pygmies
A Pygmy I am and a Pygmy I’ll remain.
34. He does this by enunciating a counter-discourse on civilization that celebrates
the nude, the raw, and the unsophisticated. Elwood’s critique here reaches far
beyond the realm of Cameroon socio-politics and touches upon the academic
debate about the limits of Western cultural hegemony and monopoly of taxonomy
and knowledge production (PRAKASH 1994).
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a popular culture that has help establish a sphere of ethnic tolerance and
respect. Several other Cameroonian artists before Elwood had expressed
similar messages of mutual ethnic acceptance in their work. The impor-
tance of sports in general, and soccer in particular (with such superstars as
Roger Milla), as powerful instrument and example of ethnic tolerance in
Cameroon is well known and needs no further emphasis here. In music,
Petit Pays, a native Duala artist, proclaimed in his first release that his
mother was Duala and his father a Hausa. The Duala born musician Ben
Decca had composed lyrics in Bamileke dialects, while many Francophone
musicians have sung in English. In stand up-comedy, the French speaking
comedian Dave K. Moktoï won fame in the late 1970s early 1980s by
impersonatingL’homme bien de là-bas,a very self-conscious upscale
Anglophone man.
The most interesting illustrations of the role of art as vehicle of ethnic
acceptance are, nevertheless to be found in instances of contrasts or even
collisions between politics and culture. In February 1997, the Sawa elite
organized “anti-Bamileke rallies” in the city of Douala, but in the meantime
Petit Pays was singing his admiration for these very same Bamileke. In
the late 1996 early 1997, the democratic process in Cameroon was enmeshed
in ethnic politics and rhetoric between Bamileke and Duala ethno-culture
brokers was hot. Yet, Marilyn Douala-Bell Schaub of the Bell chiefly fam-
ily, an avant-gardeart promoter, set up a monumental statue christened
Statue de la Nouvelle Liberté(Statue of the New Liberty) executed by a
Bamileke sculptor (Elimbi). In 1991-92 the BamilekeLa’akam, called on
the boycott of beers manufactured by the “Brasseries du Cameroun”, a state-
and French-owned brewing company known to be associated with the Beti
Paul Biya. But it is not unlikely that Bamileke natives nationwide were
dancing at the beat ofbikutsi, the “Beti music”, or were laughing at the
Beti comedian, Jean-Michel Kankan’s impersonation of your “typical Bami-
leke man”.
These and other examples underscore the fact that popular culture, even
when presented or promoted by politicians as “ethnic” music (as was once
the case withbikutsi music), ultimately provides a public space of mutual
ethnic acceptance in Cameroon. They all serve to illustrate what Célestin
Monga means when he declares that “one cannot confine the study of Afri-
can countries in the analysis of their sociopolitical or economic structures
alone” (Monga 1991: 31)35. As regards the future of Cameroon as a nation,
35. In music, this is so whether the artists adopt a “rebellious” stance like Fela,
Lapiro de Mbanga, Les Salopards, Poussins Choc, or Myriam Makeba; take a
“softer” approach like Lokua Kanza, Cesario Evora, Henri Dikongue, or Richard
Bona to name but the newest talents in that domain; opt for a “truly leisure”
beat like Charlotte Mbango, Kofi Olomide, Grace Decca, Papa Wemba, Petit
Pays, or Meiway; or for a more “intellectual” genre as in the case of Francis
Bebey, Pierre Akendegue, Ray Lema, Manu Dibango, and most recently Donny
Elwood. Each in their own style and sensitivity, these artists are formulating
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however, one cannot but wonder how long popular culture will be able to
stand as the last line of defense against the onslaught of ethnic politics,
social injustice, material deprivation and political disenfranchisement.
Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.
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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the emergence of the concept of “village” as a new paradigm
for popular representation through a study of the interplay of space, ethnic identity,
and electoral politics in a context of competition for decreasing state resources.
Cameroonian politicians are exploiting cultural differences by engaging in political
discourses that couch cross-ethnic economic inequalities and social injustice in
regional terms. Posing as representatives of their villages they redesign rural bound-
aries, act as culture brokers, and use rural constituencies to boost their careers.
This dual process of ethnicization and ruralization of politics has developed close
connections between urban and rural elite, with the latter gaining substantial political
significance. While politicians are using culture as a divisive force, some artists are
providing a space for mutual ethnic acceptance through popular culture.
RÉSUMÉ
“Au village!”: la production du local dans la politique camerounaise. — Cet article
analyse le concept de “village” en tant que nouveau paradigme de la représentation
populaire, à travers l’étude de l’interaction entre l’identité ethnique et la politique
électorale envisagées dans un contexte de compétition accrue autour d’une rente
étatique déclinante. Les politiciens camerounais exploitent les différences culturelles
en forgeant un discours politique qui transcrit les inégalités économiques transeth-
niques et l’injustice sociale en termes régionalistes. Se posant comme des représen-
tants de leurs propres villages, ils redessinent les frontières rurales, se comportent
comme des intermédiaires culturels et utilisent les circonscriptions rurales pour doper
leur carrière politique. Ce double processus d’ethnicisation et de ruralisation de la
vie politique a entraîné le développement de liens étroits entre l’élite urbaine et
rurale, cette dernière y gagnant une visibilité politique accrue. Par ailleurs, alors que
les politiciens utilisent la culture comme une force de division, certains artistes, par
le biais de la culture populaire, parviennent à définir un espace de communica-
tion transethnique.
Keywords/Mots-clés: Ahmadou Ahidjo, Paul Biya, electoral village, ethnic identities,
ethnic quotas, multiparty elections, regional equilibrium, regionalism, village affilia-
tion/Ahmadou Ahidjo, Paul Biya, appartenance villageoise, élections multipartistes,
équilibre régional, identités ethniques, quotas ethniques, régionalisme, villagisation
politique.
